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The Future of Educational
The new principles
announced in
Tuttle, Eisenberg,
and Capacchione
might eventually
require greater real
change in school
attendance policies
(and perhaps also
in faculty and
staff assignment
policies) than any
court decisions
since Brown.
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Old Decrees,
New Challenges
John Charles Boger and Elizabeth Jean Bower
oday, more than at any time since
1954, North Carolina school
boards face a legal challenge to the
tools of desegregation, a challenge with
the potential to undo much of the educational diversity that has been achieved
since Brown v. Board of Education.1 The
new challenge has found its first decisive
judicial expression in three recent federal
decisions, two of them rendered by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit and the third by a federal district
court sitting in Charlotte: Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board,2 Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public
Schools,3 and Capacchione v. CharlotteMecklenburg Schools.4 Together these
decisions suggest important new constitutional do’s and don’ts for local school
boards. The requirements depart sharply
from the rules laid down during the
Brown era, adherence to which now
seems to be second nature for administrators, teachers, students, and parents
in public schools throughout North
Carolina and the nation.
In essence the new decisions forbid all
school boards (unless they are operating
under federal desegregation decrees) from
considering race or ethnicity as they assign
children to public schools. The prohibition holds even if it leads to resegregated
schools, even if most parents desire their
children to attend racially diverse schools,
and even if school boards are acting in

T
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good faith to ensure that students receive
the educational benefits that may come
from a diverse school environment.
The future of the new principles announced in Tuttle, Eisenberg, and Capacchione remains uncertain. To date,
the Supreme Court has not agreed to
consider them. However, they might
eventually require greater real change in
school attendance policies (and perhaps
also in faculty and staff assignment policies) than any court decisions since
Brown. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit
Court decisions set forth constitutional
rules that purport to bind every school
district within the circuit, which includes
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. So
North Carolinians cannot ignore them.
Instead, every state and local school
board and every interested parent must
give them close attention.
Understanding this potential change
requires that interested citizens and public
school officials review the constitutional
landscape of school assignment policies.
This article undertakes that review. First,
it looks at the legal requirements created
by Brown and two important cases that
followed it—Green v. County School
Board of New Kent County5 in 1968 and
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education6 in 1971. Together the three
cases clarified the specific obligations
resting on all school systems found to
have engaged in formal racial segregation. Next, the article examines three
Supreme Court cases from the early
1990s that offer important new guidance
on when and how school districts under
court order can gain release from further
judicial oversight.
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The article then reviews the basics of
another body of law on the Equal Protection Clause that has emerged in response to the debate over affirmative
action in government contracting, public
employment, and college admissions. It
explores how the Fourth Circuit Court
in Tuttle and Eisenberg has applied that
body of law in a new context—the assignment of children to elementary and
secondary public schools. Finally, because Tuttle and Eisenberg constitute the
law that now applies to school districts
in the Fourth Circuit, the last two portions of the article assess the legal choices
still open to school boards and parents
in North Carolina and describe some
innovative steps being taken in Wake
County.

Desegregation: 1954 to 1990
In May 1954 the U.S. Supreme Court
declared in Brown that the South’s traditional “dual system” of public education
was inconsistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7
Brown directly challenged the fundamental policy reflected in public school
segregation—the assignment of black
and white children to different schools.
After Brown, many Southern school
boards initially chose to ignore or defy
the Court and the Constitution, invoking principles of state sovereignty and
longstanding racial traditions. After
years of stubborn resistance in some districts and grudging acquiescence in others,8 most school districts eventually
began to implement school desegregation in earnest. Widespread change did
not begin, however, until 1965, when
Congress first conditioned eligibility for
its massive education spending program
under the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act on compliance with the
antidiscrimination provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.9
Even after desegregation began in
earnest, protracted legal challenges continued in the 1960s and 1970s as federal
courts struggled to resolve many legal
and educational debates over the meaning
of Brown’s central insight that “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal.” Not until 1968, in the watershed
case of Green, did the Supreme Court
finally outline the changes that would be
4
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necessary in every formerly segregated
school system. Every such system, it announced, bore an “affirmative duty” to
“take whatever steps might be necessary
to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.” The Green Court
specified at least six areas in which federal courts should measure progress toward
a “unitary” (desegregated) school system:
(1) student enrollments, (2) faculty assignments, (3) administrative and staff assignments, (4) transportation to schools,

T

he prohibition holds
even if it leads to
resegregated schools,
even if most parents desire
their children to attend
racially diverse schools, and
even if school boards are
acting in good faith.

(5) extracurricular activities, and (6) physical facilities.10
The Green Court rejected the school
district’s argument that it had complied
with its desegregation obligations when,
in 1965, it adopted a “freedom of choice”
approach that permitted all parents—
black or white—to choose the public
school their children would attend. Offering school choice, the Court held, did
not suffice in the New Kent County
school district because that plan had not
worked in practice to achieve measurable student desegregation.11 Green made
unmistakably clear that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires tangible results—
real racial integration—not merely compliance with formal color-blind procedures.
In 1971 the Supreme Court again
turned to the issue of school desegregation in Swann, a famous decision involving the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school
district. Speaking for all nine justices,
Chief Justice Warren Burger held that
federal courts were fully authorized to
require a variety of tools to achieve
school desegregation, including (1) express racial percentages as initial targets
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in assigning students to desegregating
schools; (2) express racial ratios of faculty and staff; (3) administrative “pairing”
and “clustering” of two or more geographically distant residential areas to
create racially diverse student assignment zones; and (4) use of cross-town
busing or other transportation remedies,
if necessary. The Court acknowledged
that school boards would need to consider students’ races expressly as they
assigned students to schools in order to
achieve meaningful desegregation.12
In a companion case decided the same
day as Swann, the Court condemned a
North Carolina state statute that forbade assignment of children by race,
local school board plans relying on
racial balances or ratios, and use of
involuntary busing.13 Again writing for a
unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger
rebuffed North Carolina’s argument that
the Constitution required color-blind
student assignments and forbade any use
of racial balancing in public education.
He described race-conscious student
assignments as an essential tool to fulfill
“the promise of Brown”:
Just as the race of students must be
considered in determining whether
a constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in formulating a remedy.
To forbid, at this stage, all assignments made on the basis of race
would deprive school authorities
of the one tool absolutely essential
to fulfillment of their constitutional obligation to eliminate existing
dual school systems.14
During the twenty years that followed,
Green and Swann provided the basic
guidelines for southern school desegregation.
Some North Carolina school districts
did not wait to be sued. Clearly seeing
the handwriting on the wall, they submitted official forms devised by the federal Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW), declaring themselves to be fully desegregated. In 1967
the civil rights functions of HEW were
consolidated under the Office for Civil
Rights (OCR). Using more specific
guidelines and armed with greater personnel, OCR moved beyond reliance on
school board assurances and began to

Following the historic Brown decision
in 1954, supporters gathered at St.
Joseph’s AME Church in Durham.
perform actual reviews of school compliance. OCR combined this approach
with negotiations with the local school
districts. HEW gradually began to move
away from the pre–1964 focus of
“shooting for court cases” and worked
more cooperatively with local districts to
achieve compliance. Although exact
numbers are difficult to obtain, this
comprehensive, cooperative approach
resulted in stronger ties with local officials and, together with the strong
Supreme Court statements in Green and
Swann, turned most districts toward
compliance in a spirit of cooperation.15

Desegregation in the 1990s
In the early 1990s, after nearly two
decades of silence, the Supreme Court
returned to the issue of southern school
desegregation. By then, the principal
question was no longer, What must
school boards lawfully do to desegregate? but How long should judicial
supervision of school boards last? and

When and by what standards should a
federal court determine that a school district has completed its remedial tasks
and become, not a dual system, but a
unitary system at last? The Court’s first
important decision on these questions
came in 1991 in Board of Education of
Oklahoma City v. Dowell. From the
outset, sharp differences from earlier
decisions were evident in Dowell’s tone
and emphasis. No longer unanimous—
indeed, sharply divided in a 5-to-3 opinion written by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist—the Court stressed that federal supervision of local school systems
had been intended only as “a temporary
measure to remedy past discrimination”
and that “important values” are served
by “local control of public school systems.”16 Although the Court eventually
sent Dowell back to the lower courts for
further consideration, most court watchers read the case as a signal that the era
of court-ordered desegregation decrees
might be drawing to a close.
The next year the Court reinforced
that impression in Freeman v. Pitts, a
case arising in the suburban Atlanta district of DeKalb County. The school board

in Freeman sought a declaration that it
had overcome its racial duality between
1979 and 1992 and now was unitary.
Such a declaration would permit the district’s release from further judicial supervision. Measuring the district against the
six Green factors, the Supreme Court
held, for the first time, that a federal
court might properly release a school
system from judicial supervision one factor at a time. To merit such an outcome,
a school board must demonstrate that it
has sufficiently overcome racial problems in that one area—such as student
assignments or extracurricular activities—even if racial disparities remain in
another area—such as faculty assignments.17
The Freeman Court also held that, if
a school district has diligently followed a
court’s student assignment orders for a
significant period, a court might withdraw further judicial supervision—even
if schools’ racial populations have subsequently become imbalanced—as long as
the emerging racial imbalance can plausibly be traced not to the school board
but to other causes, such as residential
decisions made by parents themselves.18
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To aid lower federal courts in determining when they should declare a
school district to be unitary and withdraw judicial supervision, the Freeman
Court directed them to weigh three new
factors:
[1] whether there has been full and
satisfactory compliance with the
[desegregation] decree in those
aspects of the system where supervision is to be withdrawn;
[2] whether retention of judicial
controls is necessary or practicable
to achieve compliance with the decree in other facets of the school
system [e.g., other Green factors
still under court supervision]; and
[3] whether the school district has
demonstrated . . . its good-faith
commitment to the whole of the
court’s decree and to those provisions of the law and the Constitution that were the predicate
for judicial intervention in the first
instance.19
Read broadly, each of these factors

TUTTLE, EISENBERG,
AND CAPACCHIONE:
CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND?
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board
and Eisenberg v. Montgomery County
Public Schools, and the CharlotteMecklenburg district court in Capacchione
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior
cases to forbid school districts from considering race when they assign students
to public schools. This conclusion seems
constitutionally doubtful for four reasons.1
First, although the Fourth Circuit
Court in both Tuttle and Eisenberg acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s
prior cases appeared to leave open the
question of whether “educational diversity” might be a “compelling government
interest”—and therefore the Fourth
Circuit Court assumed that it was — the
district court held that it was not.2 To this
extent the district court has gone beyond
the Fourth Circuit Court’s opinions, and
its decision may well be reversed on that
ground alone.

6
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Second, in most of the cases cited by
the Fourth Circuit Court, the compelling
government interest at stake was remedial
—for example, to compensate for a government’s prior discriminatory exclusion
of willing African-American job applicants
or contractors from any consideration as
teachers or government contractors, respectively. Understandably, when the
objective is to compensate victims of prior
discrimination, federal courts are vigilant
to ensure that relief not be extended to
minority group members who themselves
were never victimized, especially at the
cost of disadvantaging other, nonminority
competitors for the same scarce resources.
Yet educational diversity is another
kind of compelling interest with a different objective. A school board uses race
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in making assignments, not to achieve a
remedial goal but to advance present and
future educational ends by creating a
racially diverse learning climate that will
benefit all children. In a world growing
more racially and ethnically interdependent every year, reasonable educators
could surely conclude that every child has
a compelling interest to learn about
people of other racial backgrounds. Such
educational judgments are strongly
confirmed by a host of social science
studies on the educational desirability of
integrated schooling.3 In dismissing a
school board’s race-conscious assignment
policies, in reliance on cases that arose in
a remedial context, the Fourth Circuit
Court failed to take school districts’
unique goals seriously.

subtly shifted primary judicial attention
from a practical concern about concrete
consequences of school board actions—
whether black and white children, teachers, and staff were actually attending
school together—toward a technical
concern about formal compliance with
court decrees. Freeman also reinforced
the theme of local control and the temporary nature of court supervision that
had been voiced in Dowell. The “end
purpose” of federal desegregation litigation, the Court emphasized, must be “to
remedy the violation and, in addition, to
restore state and local authorities to the
control of a school system,” in order to
restore the “vital national tradition” of
local school board autonomy.20
In 1995 in Missouri v. Jenkins (III),
the Court expanded on its new criteria
for assessing unitary status when it
reviewed the progress of the Kansas
City, Missouri, school district toward
unitary status.21 Jenkins III stressed that
courts did not need to require the elimination of racial disparities—for example, in test scores—unless the plaintiffs

could trace those disparities directly to
prior segregation, and that school districts had no affirmative duty to implement educational policies merely to
encourage white suburban children to
return to urban school districts.
Together, Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins III have invited the round of unitary
status litigation that is currently under
way throughout the nation, offering
school districts the prospect of a more
successful trip to the federal courthouse
for release from judicial supervision.

Third, as the accompanying article
explains, most of the cases relied on by
the Fourth Circuit Court arose in a special
context, the awarding of a scarce governmental resource to one of several rival
claimants of different races— whether
that resource was a construction contract
(City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.;
Adarand Constructors v. Pena), a governmental franchise (Metro Broadcasting
v. FCC), a seat in a professional school
(Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke), or a seat in a competitive-exam
high school (Wessmann v. Gittens).4
When a state bestows such a benefit,
its action may be unfair if decisions
purportedly based on worth or merit—
lowest bidder, best qualified or most
competitive applicant—instead tip toward a less competitive or less qualified
claimant solely because of his or her race
or ethnicity.
But seats in a public school are common goods, not scarce public resources.
Every child is sent to school; no child is denied. Of course, every public school has its
distinguishing characteristics: history, identifying architectural features, special pro-

grams, and principal and corps of teachers,
each with particular talents and personalities. Yet no parent or child has a right to
attend a particular public school. For legal
purposes, all public schools are equivalent
and interchangeable. To that extent the
law normally recognizes no winners and
losers. The analogy to the “I-win/youlose” world of government contracting or
admission to public higher education is
inapplicable.5 Hence there is less need for
concern about creating unintended
victims from such racial preferences.
Moreover, because the goal is
educational diversity, these preferences
do not uniformly favor blacks or whites,
Latinos or Anglos. Instead, they work in
both directions to ensure that every
school has a healthy racial and ethnic mix
of students. Some white students may be
denied transfers to a school whose population is tilting strongly toward whites.
Some black students may simultaneously
be denied transfers to a school in which
blacks already are overrepresented. Such
choices, unlike those in admissions, employment, or contracting, contain no
implicit messages about the inherent merit,

Affirmative Action Principles
Applied to Desegregation
The Strict-Scrutiny Test
In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court began to consider race in a very different
context from school desegregation. State
legislatures, public employers, and others had started creating voluntary programs of affirmative action to extend
some limited preferences to AfricanAmericans (or other traditionally disadvantaged groups) as compensation for

prior decades of wholesale discrimination. Eventually, unhappy whites raised
legal challenges to these programs, which
were targeted at admission to public colleges and universities,22 public employment,23 and public contracting.24
The Supreme Court was initially uncertain about how to address the new
racial preferences because, unlike traditional discriminatory legislation, they
apparently were intended not to punish
or subordinate disfavored racial groups
but to compensate group members for
the legal and economic exclusion that
they had endured under slavery and Jim
Crow segregation. Nonetheless, in City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., a watershed case decided in 1989, a majority of
five justices reasoned that all state or local policies that employed race-conscious
classifications should be subjected to
“strict judicial scrutiny.” Under strict
scrutiny, as Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
clarified it, federal courts should examine
and invalidate any race-conscious categories or factors, whether motivated by
racial hostility or goodwill, unless the
value, or achievement of any racial or
ethnic group.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit Court seems
to have ignored or overlooked a substantial body of prior holdings and comments
by the U.S. Supreme Court or individual
justices on this very issue. In Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
the Court sharply distinguished between
the limited authority of federal courts to
adopt race-conscious schooling policies as
a remedy for constitutional violations and
the broad discretion granted to local
school boards to take similar actions for
valid educational reasons. Chief Justice
Warren Burger wrote as follows:
School authorities are traditionally
charged with broad power to formulate
and implement educational policy and
might well conclude, for example, that in
order to prepare students to live in a
pluralistic society each school should
have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white
students reflecting the proportion for the
district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities;
absent a finding of a constitutional violation, however, that would not be within
the authority of a federal court.6
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state or local agency could demonstrate
that the racial categories (1) would promote “compelling government interests”
and (2) were “narrowly tailored” (carefully drawn) to achieve their compelling
ends without causing undue racial injury
to innocent victims.25 This twofold constitutional test has since been widely
employed to scrutinize race-conscious
preferences that appear in a variety of
state and federal statutes.26
Extension of Croson’s Strict Scrutiny
to Student Assignment to Schools
In both of the Fourth Circuit Court’s
recent opinions, white parents challenged school board decisions that
depended in part on considerations of
race or ethnicity. In Arlington County,
Virginia, the school board designated
one of its public kindergartens as a
“magnet” school, a school to which students were permitted to apply for admission. There were more applicants than
available spaces, so the school district
instituted a lottery system. To ensure
educational and racial diversity, howev-

er, the district structured the lottery to
give special weight to children from
lower-income backgrounds, children
whose native language was not English,
and children with racial or ethnic minority backgrounds.27 Parents of Grace
Tuttle and other white children who
applied for, but were not accepted into,
the kindergarten class, brought suit,
relying on the logic of the affirmative
action cases to argue that the school district’s use of racial considerations violated the Equal Protection Clause.
In the second Fourth Circuit case,
the parents of Jacob Eisenberg challenged
the student transfer policy of Montgomery County, Maryland. In reviewing students’ requests for transfer from one
school to another, Montgomery school
officials considered the race of the students as well as the racial composition
of the potential sending and receiving
schools, to ensure that the transfers would
not upset the overall racial makeup of
schools within the district. The Eisenbergs sued, alleging that their child would
have been transferred to a math and

science magnet school but for his race.28
In both Tuttle and Eisenberg, the
school districts responded that affording
children a racially diverse educational
experience was itself a sufficiently compelling goal to meet the standards of
strict scrutiny. Therefore, educational
diversity should justify the use of race in
making student assignments.29 In the
absence of definitive guidance by the
Supreme Court, the judicial panels in
both cases assumed that a school district’s interest in educational diversity
might well be compelling.30 However,
when they turned to the second branch
of the strict-scrutiny test — whether the
means chosen by the school board were
narrowly tailored to minimize racial harm
— they condemned the actions of the Arlington and Montgomery County school
boards as not narrowly tailored enough,
and they strongly suggested that any
school district plan that employs “racial
balancing” is per se impermissible.31
The Fourth Circuit Court has recently
considered another appeal on these issues,
brought by civil rights plaintiffs and the

For the notes to this sidebar, see page 16.
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Subsequently (in 1978), as noted
in the accompanying article, William
Rehnquist, then an associate justice,
expressed his view that the Constitution
would clearly permit Los Angeles County
to implement a voluntary, race-conscious
school assignment plan.7 Later, in the
Denver desegregation case, Justice Lewis
F. Powell, Jr., wrote that school boards “of
course [are] free to develop and initiate
further plans to promote school desegregation,” beyond those constitutionally
required by Brown, especially in America’s
“pluralistic society,” where schools might
wish to teach “students of all races [to]
learn to play, work, and cooperate with
one another.”8
Although both the language and the
logic of these prior cases addressed the
very matter at issue in Tuttle, Eisenberg,
and Capacchione, neither the Fourth Circuit Court nor the district court discussed
any of them in striking down all future
race-conscious student assignments.9
—John Charles Boger and
Elizabeth Jean Bower

A collage of the face masks created by children at Carrboro (N.C.) Elementary
School conveys the school’s racial and ethnic diversity.
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Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board
itself. They have challenged the September 1999 decision rendered by a federal
district court in Capacchione (1) declaring that the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
school district had achieved unitary status, (2) dismissing the district’s thirty-fiveyear desegregation lawsuit, (3) lifting all
court orders requiring desegregation,
and (4) imposing a new order forbidding
all further use of race or ethnicity as factors in admitting children to the district’s
magnet schools.32
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school
board and the original Swann attorneys
argued that the district court was wrong
on all counts: (1) significant vestiges of
Charlotte-Mecklenburg’s prior segregation remained to be corrected, and therefore a unitary status finding was inappropriate; and (2) even if CharlotteMecklenburg had become a unitary system, it might lawfully consider race in
making student assignments to achieve
educational diversity and avoid resegregation of its schools.
A three-judge panel of the Fourth
Circuit Court, by a 2-1 vote, agreed with
the Swann plaintiffs that the CharlotteMecklenburg schools had not yet been
proven unitary in several respects, including student assignment, school facilities, transportation policies, and student
achievement. The case has therefore
been remanded to the district court for
further consideration.33

Tuttle and Eisenberg
in the Year 2000
Although serious questions exist about
the legal soundness of Tuttle and Eisenberg
(see the sidebar on page 6), the Fourth
Circuit Court has spoken in the two cases.
Unless and until the Supreme Court
agrees to resolve this issue, the cases supply binding legal precedent for every
school district in North Carolina and
neighboring states. The practical question, then, is, What latitude do the cases
afford North Carolina school districts in
making future student assignments?
Every school district must begin by
considering its legal status. If it is currently subject to an active desegregation
order, then not only Green and Swann
but the specific terms of court orders in
its own case still provide the controlling

legal authority for the district. Such school
boards may continue—indeed, they must
continue—whatever race-conscious remedies have been prescribed by earlier federal decrees until their school districts
have been declared unitary and released
from federal supervision. Nothing in Tuttle and Eisenberg holds to the contrary.
Nor has the Supreme Court ever suggested that the school districts themselves are
under any constitutional obligation to
seek release from existing court orders.
The Fourth Circuit Court’s new decisions have their greatest immediate significance for school districts that either
were never subject to a desegregation
decree or now are considered unitary
and released from federal judicial supervision. At a minimum, Tuttle and Eisenberg forbid these districts from using
race or ethnicity when they assign stu-

dents to magnet schools or evaluate student transfer requests. Yet the logic of
these cases may prohibit a student asignment plan of any sort that might directly
employ racial or ethnic considerations.
Many questions remain unresolved
by the Fourth Circuit Court’s recent decisions. Do these cases forbid all majorityto-minority (M-to-M) transfer programs,
under which school boards honor voluntary requests if the students seek to
transfer to a school in which their race is
in the minority? M-to-M programs differ from the Montgomery County program in that they don’t specify any concrete racial or ethnic goals or quotas.
They thereby avoid the racial balancing
that Tuttle and Eisenberg treated as almost unconstitutional per se. Yet such
policies do discourage increases in the
relative size of any racial group once it

p o p u l a r g ov e r n m e n t
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exceeds 50 percent of the school’s population, and they operate by sorting transfer applicants according to race. M-to-M
programs probably will have a difficult
time surviving Tuttle and Eisenberg.
Another unresolved question is
whether these cases forbid any consideration of race or ethnicity when school
boards draw or redraw their school
attendance boundaries. While forbidding school boards to use express racial
classifications in making individual student assignments, Tuttle cited with favor
three school zoning measures identified
by an Arlington schools study commission that might well produce greater
racial diversity: (1) The board would
assign a small geographic area to a home
school and fill the remaining spaces in
that school “by means of an unweighted
random lottery from a . . . geographic
10

p o p u l a r g ov e r n m e n t

area [that] would presumably be selected
so that its residents would positively
effect [sic] the diversity of the school.”
(2) The board would put the names of
every child in the school district into a
lottery, randomly select a certain number, and offer those randomly selected
the opportunity to enter a second lottery
comprising those who would like to
attend a particular magnet school. (3)
“Each neighborhood school . . . [would
receive] a certain number of slots at each
alternative [magnet] school.”34
Both the first and the third of these
alternatives rest on the unexamined (yet
surely accurate) assumption that different racial and ethnic groups typically live
in separate neighborhoods. The panel’s
approving citation of these alternative
measures suggests that a high degree of
race-conscious behavior in developing
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neighborhood feeder patterns for elementary and secondary schools may be
acceptable, as long as the formal criteria
finally adopted are racially neutral.35
This distinction between direct and
racially explicit plans, on the one hand,
and indirect but racially conscious plans,
on the other hand, seems consistent with
constitutional principles currently emerging in the voting rights/redistricting area.
The Supreme Court has recently acknowledged that “a legislature may be
conscious of the voters’ races [when it
engages in redistricting] without using
race as a basis for assigning voters to districts,” as long as race does not become
the “dominant and controlling consideration.”36
In sum, school boards desiring to
retain some degree of racial diversity
probably may do so (1) if they avoid for-

mal criteria that expressly look to race
or ethnicity (such as racial goals or quotas for individual schools) and (2) if they
avoid actual practices in which race
becomes “the dominant and controlling
consideration” in making student assignments. Yet it seems implausible to imagine
the current Fourth Circuit Court approving aggressive pairing and clustering approaches such as those upheld in Swann
in 1971—joining two or more geographically noncontiguous and racially diverse
neighborhoods to create a single attendance zone—if the only explanation for
the selection of those neighborhoods is
their racial composition.37
Beyond student assignment policies,
Tuttle and Eisenberg have grave implications for other administrative practices
common in many North Carolina school
districts. Some districts expressly consider race or ethnicity in assigning teachers
or administrative personnel to various
schools; they may well see future challenges to those practices. The Fourth
Circuit Court’s constitutional rationale
appears broad enough to throw into
question all assignment policies for faculty, administrators, or other school personnel that expressly rely on racial considerations. Indeed, in the related area of
teacher dismissal policies, both the
Supreme Court and other circuits have
disapproved of layoff procedures employing racial considerations.38 Further,
at least in terms of layoffs, the Supreme
Court has rejected the argument that the
need of schoolchildren for teacher role
models of different racial backgrounds is
sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny.39

The Wake County Experiment
In light of Tuttle and Eisenberg, Wake
County has chosen to discard all reliance
on race as a factor in making its student
assignments, while actively seeking student diversity through consideration of
both family socioeconomic status and
student academic performance. Wake
County’s previous use of magnet programs and racial guidelines enabled it to
achieve extensive desegregation; according to a recent study, only 21 percent of
Wake County’s black students, far less
than the national average of 70 percent,
were in schools with a total minority
enrollment above 50 percent.40

Under the new Wake County plan,
the district is committed to having no
school in which (1) more than 40 percent of the children are eligible for free
or reduced-price school lunches (such
eligibility being a widely employed indicator of lower family income) or (2)
more than 25 percent of the students
score below grade level (averaged over
two years).41 The plan does not assign
children on the basis of their individual
circumstances. Instead, if a school’s pop-
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orth Carolinians
must await the
inevitable moment
when the Supreme Court
decides whether the Fourth
Circuit Court’s commitment
to an abstract form of
color-blindness will prevail
or whether school boards
in the Fourth Circuit again
will be allowed to consider
race and ethnic background
in making student assignments to achieve educational diversity.
ulation exceeds the socioeconomic or
achievement ceiling set by the board,
children living in neighborhoods where
a disproportionate percentage are either
low-performing or of low socioeconomic status will be moved to other schools.
Although some of the same children
targeted under a race-conscious plan
(many of them African-American) will
be transferred under this new, raceneutral plan (because they are from
lower-income families and/or have low
test scores), the two approaches are not
equivalent. Indeed, the new approach
will affect different groups of both white
and minority students:
About 38 percent of Wake’s minority students will no longer be
automatically targeted for integration. . . . And about 13 percent

of the district’s white students . . .
will be among those who could be
reassigned to help the schools
meet their new, colorblind definition of diversity.42
The continuing partial overlap is understandable, for African-American families
have disproportionately lower incomes
than white families do, not only in
North Carolina but in the nation as a
whole.43 Moreover, on average, AfricanAmerican children lag behind white children in performance on standardized
tests, again, not only in North Carolina
but in the nation as a whole.44
Is Wake County’s new plan lawful?
Can it survive constitutional challenge?
Reflection on three subquestions points
to the same conclusion: yes.
1. Why should Wake County’s reliance
on socioeconomic status or student
achievement have any better success in
withstanding Equal Protection Clause
review than race did under the plans in
Tuttle and Eisenberg?
The Supreme Court long ago reserved
the exacting form of strict scrutiny
employed by the Fourth Circuit Court in
Tuttle and Eisenberg for statutes that
draw distinctions based on race, ethnicity, or national origin, and for those that
“substantially burden” a small category
of so-called fundamental rights. The
Court has specifically held that education is not one of those fundamental
rights and that statutes making distinctions based on wealth or poverty (such
as the socioeconomic factor adopted by
Wake County) should not receive strict
judicial review.45 Indeed, most other legislative choices are reviewed under the
“rational basis” test, a standard so
remarkably lenient that literally only a
handful of plaintiffs have ever succeeded
in having statutes invalidated as unconstitutional.46
Both of Wake County’s chosen factors are designed to encourage educational diversity—surely a legitimate end,
since the Fourth Circuit Court assumed
it to be “compelling” in Tuttle and
Eisenberg—and to improve children’s
academic performance. Moreover, the
two factors chosen by the school board
to attain these important ends are closely
and substantially related to those ends.
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A consistent body of empirical research
has proven that students in “high poverty” schools (those with very high percentages of children from low-income
families) tend to perform at lower academic levels—irrespective of their own
family’s economic circumstances—than
children in “low poverty” schools do.47
Wake County’s new attention to the socioeconomic composition of its schools
therefore should not only increase the
diversity of its schools’ student bodies
but also eliminate all high-poverty
schools in Wake County and thereby
improve the average educational performance of children in formerly highpoverty schools.
The other educational strategy adopted by the Wake County school board—
not permitting a concentration of lowperforming students in any schools—
will tend to ensure that all schools have a
majority of high-achieving students and
that neither teachers nor parents nor
other students will be inclined to flee
from particular schools because of the
students’ disappointing performance on
state standardized tests. These are manifestly reasonable means to achieve worthy and important educational ends.
2. Isn’t this plan merely a subterfuge?
Hasn’t Wake County kept its racial assignment system under another name?
The question is an important one, for
the Supreme Court has long held that
even if a statute or an administrative
practice appears to be racially neutral on
its face, it still may violate the Equal
Protection Clause if it was adopted, or is
administered, with a racial motivation.48
Yet even if the impact of a statute falls
more heavily on one race than on another, the federal courts will not invalidate
the statute on Equal Protection Clause
grounds as long as it is not motivated
(solely or principally) by racial considerations. The Wake County plan, as noted
earlier, has strong nonracial justifications in addition to the legitimate interest in racial diversity. The plan should
improve academic performance, avoid
the concentration of either poorly
performing or economically needy children in a few disfavored schools, and
increase the overall diversity of every
school. Other school districts that wish
to follow the Wake County approach
12
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should likewise be sure to establish a
clear record—in their school board
debates, in their written policies, and
in their administration of those policies—substantiating these other, nonracial goals.
3. What about the North Carolina Constitution? Didn’t the North Carolina
Supreme Court recently hold in Leandro
v. State49 that every student has the state
constitutional right to a “sound basic
education”? Isn’t that right violated by
the Wake County plan?
North Carolina schoolchildren do
indeed have a newly minted “fundamental right” to a sound basic education. Yet
in Leandro itself, the North Carolina
Supreme Court declined to extend the
weapon of strict judicial scrutiny to
every plaintiff unhappy about some local
educational decision. Instead, it instructed state courts to afford “every reasonable deference” to local educational officials and to strike a statute or a policy
only if a plaintiff could make “a clear
showing” that he or she was being
deprived of a sound basic education.50
Plausible social science evidence suggests
that Wake County’s student assignment
plan will improve the quality of education that many students receive. Moreover, as already explained, students have
no general right to insist on attendance
at any particular school or to challenge
the assignments made by local school
authorities.51

The Uncertain Future of
Student Assignments
Although the Wake County approach
seems legally sound, its political and educational future remains open. In March
2000 the PTA co-presidents at one Wake
County elementary school wrote all parents, urging them to oppose the proposed transfer of sixty-eight low-income
and low-performing students to their
school from another neighborhood. All
but one of the transferring students
would be African-American. One copresident, a white, insisted, “I’m not a
racist. . . . I’m trying to protect my neighborhood school.” The letter informed
parents that there never had been a need
for a Title I Basic Skills reading program
at their school, though the new students
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would likely need those services. The
white co-president added, “[I]f the school’s
test scores drop [because of the transferring students], neighborhood parents
would flee” and neighborhood property
values might drop. The controversy
prompted by the letters has apparently
led many parents of the transferring children to approach the local chapter of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, seeking to forestall the move on the ground that the
children should not be placed in a school
where they are not welcome.52
Meanwhile, a countywide Gallup poll
revealed that a sizable minority of Wake
County residents, 35.5 percent, want to
limit the number of low-performing children being moved and 24.5 percent
favor limiting the number of low-income
students. Yet a majority support the new
plan. Indeed, the principal of the elementary school at issue in the letter described
earlier has met with the parents of children who will be transferring, stating,
“They will be treated fairly. They will be
loved like every other child who goes
[here].”53
Obviously one key to success will be
strong, wise educational leadership. Despite the potential for parental fears and
protectiveness, the new plan aims to prevent the emergence of “winner” and
“loser” schools. As long as each school
contains a relatively similar mix of high-,
middle-, and low-income children, as well
as children performing at all academic
levels, no parent anywhere in the system
need conclude that his or her child is
being singled out for disadvantage.
Although Wake County is a pioneer
in North Carolina, it is not the first
school district nationally to adopt or
consider such an approach. Apparently
the first plan was adopted in 1992 in La
Crosse, Wisconsin, a city of 50,000. The
school board there set out to end the
wide disparities in concentrations of
poverty, ranging from 4 percent in some
schools to 68 percent in others. The district’s plan set a 45 percent ceiling and a
15 percent floor on the proportion of
low-income children in any school. As in
Wake County, the socioeconomic status
of families in La Crosse was closely
related to racial and ethnic background,
although the predominant racial minority was not African-Americans (who

Circuit Court has deprived local school
boards of the most straightforward and
direct means of ensuring that every child
learns about children of other racial and
ethnic backgrounds as an indispensable
part of his or her socialization in public
schools. North Carolinians must await
the inevitable moment when the Supreme Court decides whether the Fourth
Circuit Court’s commitment to an abstract form of color-blindness will prevail or whether school boards in the
Fourth Circuit again will be allowed to
consider race and ethnic background in
making student assignments to achieve
educational diversity. In the meantime
the experiment under way in Wake County may point toward a new and educationally superior means of achieving
similar educational goals.

Notes

accounted for only 1 or 2 percent of La
Crosse’s population) but Hmong refugees from Southeast Asia (who made up
about 12 percent of the district’s population).54 Although the La Crosse plan has
become an accepted feature of the school
system and remains in place in 2000,
four school board members lost their
positions when voters in the early years
voted against them and even organized a
recall election because of anger at their
support for the plan.55
Similar proposals have occasionally
been considered in other cities, but none
have yet been adopted. For example, in
1998 a task force of teachers in Louisville,
Kentucky, proposed a student assignment plan that would have considered
socioeconomic status and other characteristics of individual children that put
them at risk for failure. The task force’s

proposal was not approved by the school
board, however.56 In the late 1990s, San
Francisco’s school board fashioned a
plan that would have weighed students’
socioeconomic status, test scores, Englishlanguage ability, and racial or ethnic
background in making assignments.
However, in December 1999, in a ruling
similar to Tuttle and Eisenberg, a federal
judge held that the school board could
not consider children’s race and ethnicity. The school board abandoned the
entire plan rather than proceed in reliance only on students’ socioeconomic
backgrounds and prior achievement.57

Conclusion
Very few North Carolinians would willingly return to the pre–1954 era of legally segregated schooling. Yet the Fourth
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